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Abstract
This paper examines the economic rationale of the ideas of Gladstone & Chadwick on
railway regulation and the legacy of their ideas. In 1844 Gladstone proposed and
implemented what we would now call price and quantity regulation whereas in 1859
Chadwick proposed competition "for the field", i.e. the establishment of a temporary
monopoly or franchise, for a given period.
The thinking of Gladstone had been influenced by the classical school of economic thought,
most notably J R McCulloch, whilst Chadwick had ideas influenced by his association with
Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill.
This ideas still impact today; the basic pattern of price and some quantity regulation
inaugurated by Gladstone was not abolished until the 1960 Transport Act whilst Chadwicks
idea of temporary licenses or franchises came back into vogue when the railways were
privatised in 1997.
Introduction
There are two key features of nineteenth century laissez-faire economics, as described in
Taylor (1972), that we are going to touch on here are:
· The role of government being strongly influenced by both the classical economists and
the Bethamite utilitarians who both preached the virtues of economic individualism.
· The role of government being influenced by laissez-faire ideas in the development of
economic policy with any departures being justified only if for the greater good, e.g.
"Laisser-faire, in short, should be the general practice: every departure from it,
unless required by some great good, is a certain evil."
Mill (1870) Book 5, Chapter 11
It is important to recognise that the idea that government intervention was not necessarily in
stark contrast to laissez-faire had earlier been made by Adam Smith.
"According to the system of natural liberty, the sovereign has only three duties to
attend to; three duties of great importance, indeed, but plain and intelligible to
common understandings: … secondly, the duty of protecting, as far as possible,
every member of the society from the injustice or oppression of every other
member of it, or the duty of establishing an exact administration of justice; and,
thirdly, the duty of erecting and maintaining certain public works and certain
public institutions which it can never be for the interest of any individual, or
small number of individuals, to erect and maintain; because the profit could never
repay the expense to any individual or small number of individuals, though it may
frequently do much more than repay it to a great society."
Smith (1776) Book 4, Chapter 9Draft as of 04/07/03 2
The History of Railway Regulation in Great Britain: Before the 1844 Act
The majority of bills being considered in the House of Commons (and Lords) in the
nineteenth century were private bills. Those bills dealing with public works provision defined
the terms on which the entity was to operate and such bills were widely regarded both as
contracts defining private property rights and as being immune from any attempt at
retrospective legislation as this quote from 1870 shows:
"The railway companies had obtained their Acts subject to certain conditions
which had been well considered with a view to the protection both of public and
private interests. The bargain had been well made: Parliament had already sealed
its conditions, and shareholders had invested their money under them, and it
would not now be right to impose additional liabilities upon them."
Mr L. L. Dillwyn, MP for Swansea and Great Western
Railway Director (quoted in Foster (1992), pp. 18)
The first passenger railway lines were the Stockton & Darlington Railway opening in 1825
and the Liverpool & Manchester railway opening in 1830.
The railways differed from other public work provisions in that they did not have a time
limited franchise (with 21 or 42 year being the norm) or a dividend constraint. The rationale
operating here seems to have been
1. An acceptance of an argument that the magnitude of both the risk and the amount of the
investment meant that a longer payback period than 21 years was necessary.
2. A belief that there would be sufficient competition between different firms on the same
route that the opportunity for making monopoly profits that had existed on the turnpike
roads would not be repeated. Tolls for track use were regulated but charges for the
carriage of passengers or freight were not.
The monopoly profits earned by the turnpikes had been noted by economists:
"At many turnpikes, it has been said, the money levied is more than double of
what is necessary for executing, in the completest manner, the work which is
often executed in very slovenly manner, and sometimes not executed at all."
and the solution that had been suggested was essentially one of patience:
"The system of repairing the high roads by tolls of this kind, it must be observed,
is not of very long standing. We should not wonder, therefore, if it has not yet
been brought to that degree of perfection of which it seems capable. If mean and
improper persons are frequently appointed trustees, and if proper courts of
inspection and account have not yet been established for controlling their
conduct, and for reducing the tolls to what is barely sufficient for executing the
work to be done by them, the recency of the institution both accounts and
apologizes for those defects, of which, by the wisdom of Parliament, the greater
part may in due time be gradually remedied."
Both from Smith (1776) Book 5, Chapter 1
Railways initially challenged the position of the canals which had already established local
monopolies in many parts of Britain. What then happened, and thus prompted the calls for
regulation, was the creation of new transport monopolies by the railways.Draft as of 04/07/03 3
In 1836, James Morrison made a speech on the control of the railways which was remarkably
erudite in the understanding of the market that it demonstrated from an economic perspective.
James Morrison was a wealthy self-made draper and was a friend of J R McCulloch, but it
would be a serious mistake and injustice to see him as being an acolyte of McCulloch as there
is evidence that McCulloch viewed him as an equal. For example, he was one of just three
members of the Political Economy Club
1 to see McCullochs work in draft. Morrison made a
number of key points in this speech which are worth elaborating on.
First of all, he pointed out that because the enabling legislation for a railway did not preclude
firms from setting discriminatory charging policies, there was nothing to prevent the
establishment of local monopolies.
“All Acts of Parliament conferring on a Joint-Stock company the power of
making a canal or railway between two or more places, necessarily confer
peculiar powers and privileges on the subscribers, the abuse of which ought
consequently to be guarded against.  Such Acts authorise companies to carry their
works through the estates and properties of private individuals, often inflicting
inconveniences and injuries which no pecuniary compensation can remove or
repair, the only justification for which – and in my opinion it is always a
sufficient one – being the subserviency of private interests to the public good.
But this is not all; these Acts further give them what is equivalent to a
monopoly.”
Hansard (17
th May 1836), 3
rd Series, Volume 33,
column 979.
Furthermore given that the first railway between any two places was likely to choose the
most favourable route and
"… a company authorised by the Legislature to take possession of it had thereby
acquired an incommunicable privilege and a substantial monopoly, inasmuch no
company that may be formed at any future time for making a new canal or a new
railway between the same places, could come into the field under equally
favourable circumstances."
Hansard (17
th May 1836), 3
rd Series, Volume 33,
column 979.
Morrison then points out why the commonplace belief that competition would occur
between two destinations is invalid. This is because
"Suppose now, that the speculation should turn out to be a profitable one, and that
the shareholders realize a large dividend, it is plain that, under the circumstances
of the case, it would be all but impossible to reduce it, or to lessen their charges
upon the public, by bringing a rival establishment into the field; for, first, the
existing company is in possession of the best line; and, second, were it seriously
intended to form a rival establishment, the original company would seek to deter
them by reducing their charges; and if, as is probable, they succeeded in this way
                                                          
1 The Political Economy Club had been founded in 1821 as a dining club to debate the great economic issue of
the day and was restricted to thirty members at any one time. Between 1821 and 1868, it had 109 members in
total of whom just under half had been MPs at some time during this period. Its membership included Edwin
Chadwick, William Gladstone, J R McCulloch, John Stuart Mill, James Morrison, Robert Peel and David
Ricardo. More information on the interaction between Parliament and the Political Economy Club is to be found
in Fetter (1980).Draft as of 04/07/03 4
of getting rid of the threatened competition, they might again raise their charges
to the continued injury of the public.”
Hansard (17
th May 1836), 3
rd Series, Volume 33,
columns 979 - 980.
This is a classic description of predatory pricing to prevent entry. A similar statement was
made later by J. S. Mill, in 1852 to be precise, to quote (from the 1870 edition of his
Principles of Political Economy):
"They may run a race of cheapness to ruin a new candidate, but as soon as he has
established his footing they come to terms with him."
to which the solution suggested is that
"In the case of railways, for example, no one can desire to see the enormous
waste of capital and land (not to speak of increased nuisance) involved in the
construction of a second railway to connect the same places already united by an
existing one; while the two would not do the work better than it could be done by
one, and after a short time would probably be amalgamated. Only one such line
ought to be permitted, but the control over that line never ought to be parted with
by the State, unless on a temporary concession, as in France; and the vested right
which Parliament has allowed to be acquired by the existing companies, like all
other proprietary rights which are opposed to public utility, is morally valid only
as a claim to compensation."
Both from Mill (1870) Book 1, Chapter 9.
The phrase "on a temporary concession" raises the suggestion of franchising - an idea which
we will return to later when discussing Chadwick.
Morrison then provides some evidence for his assertions based upon the operation of canals
(for which there was more data available than there was for railways). He then questions the
intellectual coherence of the belief that competition should be left to itself as the sole
mechanism for working in the public interest.
“It is plain from the facts now stated, and I might have referred to fifty other
similar instances, that competition in such case is not to be depended upon, as a
means of reducing the exorbitant rates of charges which produce such
extraordinary nor unlooked-for profits. But even though competition might be
depended upon, the question arises, whether it would be right to trust exclusively
in its protection. And to this question a decided negative should be given. The
Legislature is bound to prevent, as far as it can, the unnecessary waste of public
capital. Now, it would be obviously a most flagrant waste of capital to construct
two or three canals or railways to do the business that might well be done by one,
the only object, in fact, of the construction of the latter being the reduction of the
charges made by the first, a reduction which might have been effected without
trouble or outlay, by a proper legislative provision.”
Hansard (17
th May 1836), 3
rd Series, Volume 33,
columns 981 - 982.
Morrison then turned in his speech to suggest some solutions to the issues he had raised about
the regulation of railways.
All future railway acts should have a clause in them allowing Parliament to revise the
maximum rate or return allowed for three reasons.Draft as of 04/07/03 5
1. In the early years of a railway, there would be doubts about traffic levels but as traffic
levels rose so should profit as most of the costs of a railway were fixed.
2. The lowering of transport costs by railways should create new demand for transport, so
raising revenue more than costs.
3. The technology being employed in the operation of railways was advancing and could be
presumed to continue doing so, so costs would continue to be lowered.
“But, besides the improvement of the country, and the consequent increase in
traffic, may we not also look for great improvement in the construction of
locomotive engines, and in the whole machinery and management of railroads.
These are admitted, on all hands, to be in their infancy; and yet the House of
Commons has been legislating with respect to them as if they had already attained
to the highest degree of maturity and perfection. Parliament fixes a rate of charge,
supposed to be capable of yielding a profit to a company using the present
engines upon the roads of the present construction; so that if, as is most probable,
the engines and roads should be so much improved, and the costs and other
charges so much reduced, as to enable them to perform the same work for a half
or a fourth part of the present cost, the public will be shut out from all
participation to this advantage! – Would not this be monstrously injurious to the
interests of the public? And is not Parliament bound to provide against such a
contingency.”
Hansard (17
th May 1836), 3
rd Series, Volume 33,
columns 983 - 984.
Thus a downward revision in the maximum rates of return was likely to be necessary.
“Nothing, in fact, can be more improvident, or more absurd, than that Parliament
should, once for all, fix the rate of toll when an undertaking is entered upon, and
divest itself, of the power to reduce that rate in all time to come, how greatly
soever it may exceed what would be a liberal return for the capital vested in the
undertaking.”
Hansard (17
th May 1836), 3
rd Series, Volume 33,
column 984.
And thus Morrison argues that
“For these, and a variety of reasons, I am clearly of opinion that Parliament
should, when it establishes companies for the formation of canals, railroads, or
such like undertakings, invariably reserve to itself the power to make such
periodical revisions of the rates of charge, as it may under the circumstances
deem expedient. It should then have the power to examine into the whole
management and affairs of each company, to correct what may have been amiss
in the former, and to fix the rates of charge for another period of years : always
taking care that the proprietors are allowed a fair return for the original outlay of
capital, as well as compensation for the risk which such undertakings are
generally more or less subject to.”
Hansard (17
th May 1836), 3
rd Series, Volume 33,
column 985.
Dividend limitation was deemed by Morrison to be ineffectual as
"The public has no check on the system of management, nor can it explore the
thousand channels in which profits may be distributed under other names amongDraft as of 04/07/03 6
the subscribers, nor has it any means of preventing the wanton and extravagant
outlay of money on the works, etc."
Hansard (17
th May 1836), 3
rd Series, Volume 33,
columns 984 - 985.
One option put forward by Morrison was to follow the principle of the lighthouses
“The cases of the Smalls’, the Longships’, the Dungeness’ Lights, and other
private lighthouses are instances in point. The parties by whom these lighthouses
were erected, were authorised to charge certain rates for a specified term of years,
on all ships coming within a certain distance of their lights ; the light-houses
becoming, at the end of such terms, the property of the Crown or the public : and
yet though this may be a more stringent regulation than any I propose
introducing, the arrangement has always been regarded, and with justice, as a
most improvident one, on the part of the public.”
Hansard (17
th May 1836), 3
rd Series, Volume 33,
column 986.
This is in effect, granting a license to a firm for a fixed period of time which is similar to the
franchising idea.
Morrison stopped short of his preference for a system of railway commissioners (as this
would have been politically unacceptable in the aftermath of the furore about the Poor Law
Commissioners) and suggested instead that a clause giving Parliament the right to revise
charges periodically should be inserted into each bill citing the 21 year reviews of the
turnpike acts as a precedent. However, none of the ideas of Morrison were implemented at
this time although some of them did resurface later.
In 1839 traders petitioned the House of Commons over what they saw as the monopolistic
practices of the London & Birmingham Railway. This resulted in the creation of a Select
Committee whose findings were that the earlier belief of Parliament that competition would
occur once free access to a line had been secured for payment of a toll was not working.
An extract from the report of the Select Committee illustrate their findings rather succinctly.
" It does not appear to have been the intention of Parliament to give a railway
company the complete monopoly of the means of communication on their line of
road; on the contrary, provision was made in all or most of the Acts of
Incorporation to enable other persons to place and run engines and carriages on
the road, upon payment of certain tools to the Company. The intention of
Parliament in this respect cannot, however, be carried into effect in the way
contemplated by the Legislature: for it is obvious that the payment of legal tolls is
only a very small part of the arrangement which is necessary to open railroads to
public competition; any person with the mere authority to place an engine and
carriages on a Railway would be practically unable to supply his engine with
water, or to take up and set down his passengers at any convenient station or
terminus, and, indeed would be placed at such a disadvantageous situation, that
all competition with the Company would be rendered impossible.
  The safety of the Public also requires that upon every Railway there should be
one system of management, under one superintending authority, which should
have the power of making and of enforcing all regulations necessary for theDraft as of 04/07/03 7
protection of passengers, and for duly conducting and maintaining this new mode
of communication. On this account it is necessary that the Company should
possess a complete control over their lines of road, although they should thereby
acquire an entire monopoly of the means of communication. But if these
extensive powers are to be granted to private Companies, it becomes most
important that they should be so controlled as to secure the public as far as
possible from any abuse which might arise under this irresponsible authority."
Select Committee on Railways (1839), pp. vi - vii
In 1840, the Select Committee reported and they believed that it was possible to disentangle
prices into a carrier element and a toll proprietor element. One of the main reasons why price
control per se was not used was because of issues about what was acceptable to include in the
toll proprietor element which resulted in numerous legal cases - an issue which will be
returned to when we consider the evidence presented to the Devonshire Committee in the
1860s.
The ultimate result of the deliberations of the select committee was the 1840 Railway
Regulation Act. This gave the Board of Trade the power to inspect all lines before they
opened. It was also given powers to supervise fares, rates and traffic and to investigate
accidents if it so wished. The operation of this legislation led to the creation of the Railway
Department with a staff of 3 (a statistician, an engineer and a lawyer) which was attached to
the Board of Trade. The main aim of the department was railway safety with the objective
being to certify that the provisions of the Railway Regulation Act had been met, not to ensure
standard of construction - an approach which led to criticism years later at the time of the Tay
Bridge disaster
2
The original intention of the Bill that became the Railway Regulation Act in terms of
monopoly control was to require railway companies to give full access to their accounts; this
was heavily criticised in Parliament
3 and the required returns were restricted to aggregate
traffic (of passenger by class and of goods) and accidents.
Another important role was that the Railway Department was to monitor private members
bills (which is how new lines were established
4) to
"… guard against the insertion of improper clauses."
Board of Trade Papers, 11
th August 1840
In 1842, we have a number of interesting developments.
Firstly, the Railway department investigated a case of price discrimination. Mr Langford of
Ponders End was a commuter on the Northern & Eastern Railway to London and paid 2s a
                                                          
2 At approximately 7:15 p.m. on the night of 28
th December 1879, the central navigation spans of the Tay bridge
collapsed into the Firth of Tay at Dundee, taking with them, to destruction, a train, 6 carriages and 75 people.
The Tay bridge had been open for 20 months.
3 It should be noted that it was not particular unusual for MPs to be directors of railway companies and
Bradshaw's Railway Almanack published a list of them each year from 1847 onwards. Indeed, Checkland (1971)
notes that in 1843 the shareholdings of John Gladstone (father of William) were worth £213,000 (approximately
£15,000,000 in todays (2003) terms), much of these being in railway stock.
4 Parliament gave the company the right to purchase land and operate across public highways and in return it
laid down maximum toll rates which the company must not exceed. Such Acts were based on earlier acts
authorising turnpike roads.Draft as of 04/07/03 8
day. He pointed out that the fare from London to Tottenham was 1s and the fare from
Tottenham to Ponders End was 8d, giving a combined fare of 1s 8d. Mr Langford suggested
that
"the director of railways can, by skillfully operating any one village or town, must
effectually destroy all private competition by the post road from such locality,
and having succeeded in destroying such competition in one place, the whole of
the towns or villages on the lines become in succession victims to such
operations"
Board of Trade Papers 6/280 7/1842
Such an argument by Mr Langford is, of course, a classic textbook example of predation, the
existence of which had been noted earlier by Morrison. The Northern & Eastern Railway
company argued that the 2s fare was the same as the coach but that it had decided anyway to
assimilate fares to remove any consumer dissatisfaction.
Secondly, the issue of the relationship between the railways and coach companies was raised
by G. R. Phillips, MP. He complained to Gladstone (then Vice-President of the Board of
Trade) that the Great Western Railway (GWR) had given a monopoly to Waddell of Oxford
in coach services between Steventon (then the nearest railway station to Oxford) and Oxford.
Gladstone passed the complaint onto the Railway Department to whom GWR responded that
Waddell had been contracted to meet all trains at Steventon enabling through ticketing from
Paddington onto Oxford with the coach meeting the passengers at the platform and that other
coach firms were not excluded from the station. This case and others like it revealed that the
Board of Trade was powerless to act if the railway companies sought to extend their
monopoly to the roads. The 1844 select committee on railways noted this lack of power but
no action was proposed to be taken.
Thirdly, the 1842 Railway Act was passed which was mainly a safety Act to ensure that
railways ran safe services. A requirement was made that new lines had to be inspected by the
Board of Trade, which could demand traffic returns and inquire into accidents.
The History of Railway Regulation in Great Britain: The 1844 Act
1844 had a sharp increase in the volume of railway bills which, if they has all passed, would
have lead to a 50% increase in track mileage (from the existing 2000 miles to over 3000
5).
This raised the issue in the mind of W. E. Gladstone of how this growth, both in track and in
parliamentary time, should be regulated.
W. E. Gladstone definitely had an interest in Economics and this can be tracked through his
diary. His diary entry for Easter Tuesday 1843 (Tuesday 18
th April - Foot & Matthew (1974))
noted that he begun reading the recently released 3
rd edition of "The Principles of Political
Economy" by J. R. McCulloch. He finished reading McCulloch (1843) on Saturday 6
th May;
just 7 days before becoming President of the Board of Trade.
This warning passage
"A limitation of the rate of dividend tempts a prosperous company to engage in
subsidiary undertakings, though of doubtful utility and profit"
McCulloch (1843), pp. 288
                                                          
5 For a graphical portrayal of the growth in railway track mileage in Britain during the 1825 to 1870 period, see
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does seem to indicate an understanding of what we would now call an Averch-Johnson
capital bias effect (Averch & Johnson (1962)). This is an explanation of the phenomena
where a firm whose rate of return is regulated will seek to invest in too large a stock of
capital than that which would be required for the productively efficient operation of the
business.
By the time of the 4
th edition [McCulloch (1849)], McCulloch seems to have changed his
mind substantially as he now accepts the need for regulation
"... and it is all but universally admitted that our legislation, with regard to
railways and other public works., has evinced a highly culpable inattention to the
public interests, and been discreditable to the intelligence of the country. Latterly,
however, the extraordinary extension of railway projects has forcibly attracted
attention to the subject … ; so that, by adopting a well-devised system, we may
check abuse and provide for the public interests in the lines that remain to be
granted; and may probably, also, be able to repair, in part at least, the errors
already committed in the cession of the others."
McCulloch (1849), pp. 301
An extract from an 1848 treatise on public interests puts this notion more bluntly:
"The principle of laisser-faire may be safely trusted to in some things but in many
more it is wholly inapplicable; and to appeal to it on all occasions savours more
of the policy of a parrot than a statesman or a philosopher"
McCulloch (1848), pp. 156
A slightly earlier passage in the 4
th edition of Principles suggests that McCulloch was
prepared to consider nationalisation as an option
6.
"Hence, the obvious expediency, in passing acts for the formation of railways,
canals, docks, water and gas companies, and other public works, of reserving
power for the government to make periodical revisions of the tolls or rates of
charge for the services to be performed; to control their management, in the view
of providing for the greater security and convenience of the public; and, if needs
be, to purchase up the works on reasonable terms."
McCulloch (1849), pp. 300
There is some considerable evidence that Peel had been influenced by the McCulloch and his
writings. In 1846, Adam Black wrote to McCulloch saying about the pension of £200 per
annum obtained by McCulloch for services to the science of political economy:
"I look upon it as an acknowledgement of Sir Robert Peel that he is indebted to
you for the enlightenment he received on those principles of political economy by
which he achieved his triumphant reform in our commercial systems - It is as
much as saying to the public, if I have succeeded in overthrowing the deeply
rooted abuse of the protective system you are indebted to McCulloch as the
person who furnished me with the weapons by which this was accomplished."
An extract from a letter of 7
th July 1846, quoted on pp.
111 - 112 of O'Brien (1970)
McCulloch responded by dedicating his Statistical Account of the British Empire to Peel and
continued what had been a regular correspondence between them that had begun in 1836.
                                                          
6 O'Brien (1970) notes the earlier opposition of McCulloch to nationalisation as detailed in the proceedings of
the Political Economy ClubDraft as of 04/07/03 10
McCullochs relations with Gladstone while not as close were quite affable and Gladstone
praised his comptrollership of the Stationary Office in the House of Commons in 1854 (as
detailed in Hansard (9
th June 1854), 3
rd series, Vol. 133 , columns 1345 - 1346).
The 1844 act of Gladstone was a personal measure and not a departmental measure, despite
Gladstone now being President of the Board of Trade.
Many of the bills being presented to Parliament in 1844 were for railway amalgamation and
Gladstone has noticed that previous amalgamations had led to rate increases. He also noticed
that reducing the number of railway companies would make
"arrangements between rival lines easy of accomplishment."
Hansard, 3
rd Series, Volume 72, columns 23.
This seems a clear statement of a belief that collusion was more likely as the number of firms
diminished.
The Act was based upon the findings of a select committee. The 1
st report of the Select
Committee had tried to establish the principle that each railway bill should contain a clause
making that railway not exempt from any future legislation. The 2
nd report had recommended
that all bills should go to a single committee whose members had no local or personal (i.e.
financial) interest in the matters at hand. Both of these recommendations were not reflected in
the subsequent legislation.
The 3
rd report of the Select Committee was more substantial and echoed much of what James
Morrison had said eight years earlier. The committee made recommendations in a number of
areas:
Nationalisation
"That if, at the end of a term of years to be fixed, the annual divisible Profits upon
the paid-up Share Capital of any such Line of Railway shall be equal to a
percentage to be fixed, or so soon after the expiration of the said term as the said
percentage shall have been reached, it shall be in the option of the Government
either, first, to purchase the Line at the rate of a number of years' purchase, to be
fixed, of such divisible Profits; or secondly to revise the fares and charges on the
Line, in such manner as shall, in the judgment of the Government, be calculated
to reduce the said divisible Profits, assuming always the same quantity and kinds
of annual traffic to continue, to the said percentage: but with a guarantee, on the
part of the Government to subsist while such scale of fares and charges shall be in
force, to make up the divisible Profits to the said percentage.
And also, that at or after the end of the said term of years, it shall be in the option
of the Government to purchase the Line at the said number of years' purchase of
the annual divisible Profits, whatever be the amount of such Profits.
That the term of years be fifteen, to date from the next following first of January
after the passing of the Act for the construction of the Railway."
"Parliamentary" Trains
"That the Companies may be required to provide upon such new Lines of
Railway, as a minimum of third-class accommodation, one Train at least each
way on every week-day, by which there shall be the ordinary obligation to convey
such passengers as may present themselves at any of the ordinary stations, in
carriages provided with seats and protected from the weather, at a speed not less
than 12 miles an hour including stoppages, and at fares not exceeding a penny per
mile; each passenger by such Train being allowed not exceeding 56 lbs. ofDraft as of 04/07/03 11
luggage without extra charge, and extra luggage being charged by weight at a rate
not exceeding the lowest charge by other Trains; Children under Three years
being conveyed without extra charge; and children from Three to Twelve years at
half-price.
That the tax upon the receipts from such conveyance of third-class passengers
should not exceed one half of any duty that may be laid upon the general traffic of
Railways
That the Board of Trade have a discretionary power of dispensing with any of the
above requirements, and of allowing alternative arrangements which shall appear
to it to be better calculated to promote the public convenience upon any particular
Railway; and that the Board of Trade have a discretionary control over the Train
which satisfies the above minimum requirements, as regards times of starting,
nature of accommodation, arrangements with connecting Lines, and other points
of detail, subject to the above general principles, and to the understanding that
such control is to be limited to the Train in question."
Military Trains
"That Companies shall be bound to convey upon such new Lines military and
police forces, and public stores, baggage, and ammunition, on the requisition of
the proper authorities, at fares not exceeding 1d. per mile for each private, and 2d.
per mile for each officer, with the usual accommodation, and at charges not
exceeding 2d. per ton per mile for stores and baggage; the same quantity of
personal luggage being allowed free of charge to each officer and private as to
each ordinary first and second-class passenger respectively; and the carriages in
which such forces are conveyed being, whenever so required by the proper
Authorities, provided with seats and protected against the weather."
Mail Trains
"That upon such new Lines the Post-office be empowered to required the
transmission of the Mails (subject to the usual conditions as to payment for
services performed by Railway Companies) at any rate of speed certified by the
Inspector-general to be consistent with safety; and also to send a mail-guard with
bags not exceeding the weight allowed for an ordinary passenger's luggage (or
subject to the rules of the Company for any excess of that weight) by any of the
ordinary Trains, upon the same terms and conditions as an ordinary passenger: it
being understood, that this power shall not authorise the Post-office to require the
conversion of a regular Mail Train into an ordinary Train, nor to exercise any
control over the Company in respect of any ordinary Train."
Select Committee on Railways (1844), pp. 5 - 7
The case for nationalisation had been made in an anonymous pamphlet entitled "Railway
Reform, Its Expediency and Practicability Considered" which was later found to be the work
of William Galt (who will meet again later). This pamphlet supports the case for
nationalisation with some statistical evidence, as detailed in Ekelund & Price (1979). Three
pieces of evidence concern us here.
Firstly, there is the documenting of 3
rd-degree price discrimination on 26 English railway
lines in 1842 (with statistical evidence).Draft as of 04/07/03 12
Secondly, there is the evidence from an experiment where rates were lowered in one line that
because of (what was believed to be universally) increasing demand and declining marginal
costs, rates could be cut by two-thirds and lines would not lose money.
Thirdly, there is evidence that the government purchase of railways would be feasible as
many line (almost a half in 1845) were not making a competitive rate if return.
So what was the solution; the solution in terms of overall management in 1843 was the same
as that Galt presented to the Devonshire Commission in 1865.
“Mr Ayrton: Then you would establish a statutory commission directly
responsible to Parliament?
Mr Galt: Yes; responsible directly to Parliament, and at the head of that
commission a man in the social position of our cabinet minister,
and in the same way responsible to Parliament for the management
of it.”
Royal Commission on Railways (1867), pp. 319
The rest of the solution in 1843 according to Galt was that the railways should be run by the
state in a similar manner to the recently constituted postal service.
A draft resolution was written by Gladstone on the 3
rd of February 1844 with Gladstone
speaking in favour of a railway committee two days later in the House of Commons. The
cabinet colleagues of Gladstone were at best indifferent (and in some cases hostile).
Peel himself had problems with the legislation partly for pragmatic grounds:
"… there was a material distinction to be drawn between companies approaching
parliament for the first time, and asking for authorization, and companies which,
on the faith of Parliament, had invested their capital in the construction and
establishment of great railways. Parliament, it was true, might repent of the
indiscretion and levity with which it granted powers to those companies, but still
the powers had been granted."
which is a statement of the issue mentioned earlier regarding a belief in the unalterable nature
of the rights of private property once granted. Peel also had reservations for reasons that were
squarely on the side of classical economics a la McCulloch:
"In his opinion, the natural control over these companies was not by minute
interference with their gains, or by their management, but by holding out to them
the menace of competition."
Hansard (5
th February 1844), 3
rd Series, Volume 72,
columns 249 - 250.
By March 1844, a variety of railway resolutions were being debated in the House of
Commons; a debate to which Gladstone contributed on the 4
th of March 1844. In May 1844,
Gladstone tried to rally support for his measures in the cabinet by circulating an internal
cabinet memorandum which had been heavily influenced by the report of the 1844 select
committee on railways; Gladstone having seen part of a draft on the 6th of May 1844 prior to
publication on the 15
th.
There was some limited public support for some action being taken against what was seen as
the abuse of  monopoly power, as this extract from the Illustrated London News shows:Draft as of 04/07/03 13
"The Railway shareholders are consequently, on the leading lines, dividing
among themselves from six to ten per cent on the price of the original shares. And
hence the fact that the original £100 shares are, in some instances, at from £130 to
£140 premium; while other shares on which £50 only have been paid, are at
present at a premium of from £78 to £80. 
These are stubborn facts; they are facts that speak for themselves. They disclose a
state of matters constituting a monopoly of the very worst kind. The Directors of
the leading Railway Companies having secured a monopoly of conveyance, act
towards the public as they think proper. They make their own terms because they
know the public have no remedy. They know that the public, having no other
means of conveyance between the places through which their lines pass (the
coaches being knocked off the road), are completely at their mercy."
Illustrated London News, 24
th February 1844 
The main provision of the Bill from an anti-monopoly perspective dealt with the revision of
railway charges and the potential for purchase of the railways by the state.
"Using the then existing system of a large number of independent lines it was
very difficult, if not impossible, to facilitate and cheapen railway communication;
for "if nine out of ten companies were in favour of the experiment of cheap
communication it would probably be in the power of the tenth to baffle the
effort."
Gladstone quoted in Hirst (1931), pp. 89.
By the 3
rd of July, things were not going well with the Railway Bill and Gladstone noted his
anger in his diary:
"My temper was moved by the proceedings of the Railway People today."
Foot & Matthew (1974), pp. 386
Gladstone carried on pressing and spoke for 2
1/4 hours in the House on the 8
th of July but it
was not to be and the anti-monopoly measures of the Bill were watered down with
responsibility was transferred for the financial aspects of the Bill to the Treasury during the
passage of the Bill through parliament. The price control and nationalisation measures were
contained in the first two sections of the Act. Section 1 gave Parliament the power, from 21
years after it passage (i.e. 1865), to cap the rates of any new line
7 which was earning more
than 10% a year on the value of its paid up stock.
8 Section 2 gave Parliament the power after
the same 21 year period to nationalise any railway company which was making a return of
more than 10% a year on the value of its paid up stock.
The issue of free access for coaches to station yards was initially present in the Bill but this
clause was struck out in the House of Commons. Other sections in the Act that were passed
obliged companies to carry the mail, to carry troops or police, allow public telegraph lines to
be erected along their rights-of-way and to open their own telegraphic systems to public use.
The main other addition to the powers of the Board of Trade were the parliamentary trains
provision (Section 6 of the Act) which applied to all train companies who obtained at least a
                                                          
7 The definition of a new line also included existing lines if they were extended. Most lines were being extended
during this period with some indeed being opened a stop at a time.
8 There were warnings of the 10% figure being too high with Morrison in 1848 warning that there was a risk of
"permanently guaranteeing to the shareholders the enormous dividend of 10 per cent."
Morrison (1848), pp. 128
By 1865, railways were yielding a return of about 4% per annum.Draft as of 04/07/03 14
third of their revenue from passenger traffic. The parliamentary trains provision required each
railway company to run at least one train each weekday which stopped at each station at a
speed of not less than 12 miles per hour and which conveyed third class passengers in
carriage meeting the specification of the Board of Trade for a fare not greater than 1d per
mile.  This specification was that a carriage had enclosed sides, a roof, seats and provision for
lighting and ventilation.
The History of Railway Regulation in Great Britain: After The 1844 Act
In August 1844, the Railway Department became the Railway Board partly as a result of
Gladstone seeing the increasing demand of railway regulation as a threat to the other
responsibilities of the Board of Trade. Gladstone communicated this belief to Peel in June
1844 who replied that a new department for railways outside the Board of Trade was not
possible but that a Board within a strengthened Board of Trade was possible. The 10
th Earl of
Dalhousie, who had been made Vice-President of the Board of Trade in May 1843, took
increasing responsibility for the Railway Board and effectively acted as its head rather than
Gladstone. The altered stance of Gladstone on railway matters in the aftermath of the rather
stormy passage of his Bill can be seen in this extract from a letter to Dalhousie (quoted in
Parris (1965)):
"Your accounts of the Railway Department give me great satisfaction - it has
occurred to me to ask whether you could conveniently send me the draft minutes
of the Railway Department … but it need not be thought of if it is likely to be
troublesome"
Gladstone quoted in Parris (1965), pp. 64.
Dalhousie continued with the role of acting as the head of the Railway Board when he
became President of the Board of Trade in February 1845 after the resignation of
Gladstone over a non-Trade matter (specifically the increasing of a grant to the Catholic
seminary in Maynooth). Dalhousie quickly found that the Board to be in regular conflict
with select committees of the House of Commons on a regular basis and the impact of this
was that the Commons decided strategic rail policy while the Board focussed its attentions
on safety and the parliamentary trains.
In 1846 with the return of the Whigs to power, a new department (The Commissioner of
Railways) was established which was independent of the Board of Trade but had no new
powers. In October 1851, cost-cutting measures abolished the Commissioner of Railways and
responsibility for the railways was returned to the Board of Trade.
The legislative focus of the 1850s was mainly focussed on bills in three areas:
1. The construction of new railway tracks
2. The conversion of level crossings to bridges
and
3. The amalgamation of existing railway companies.
It is the latter which is of most interest to economists and the evidence presented in depth in
Parris (1965) indicates the behind-the-scenes role played by the Board. A good example of
such a role is the case of the Lancashire & Yorkshire and East Lancashire Amalgamation
Bill, 1858. Here the Board suggested the insertion of clauses that required the amalgamated
company to build a new station in Wigan and to double the number of tracks on the Burnley
branch. The company put in a clause committing itself to a new station at Wigan within twoDraft as of 04/07/03 15
years noting that "The Chairman [of the committee] has been looking at the Board of Trade
Report"
9.
Cardwell's Select Committee of 1852-3 had recommended that amalgamations of railway
companies should be discouraged. However, the amalgamations continued and in a quarter
century period, between 1850 and 1875, the London and North Western and Great Western
companies alone absorbed 52 other railway companies between them.
The 1859 paper of Chadwick is in a sense, a position paper, on his beliefs abut how
governments should intervene in the market in general with some specific example, one of
which is railways. Some of his previous roles in government are noted in Appendix A with
more detail to be found in Finer (1952) Essentially, the argument being made by Chadwick is
that in the presence of natural monopoly regulation is not an appropriate means of proceeding
by the state and that an alternative means of handling property rights is needed.  The basic
proposition made in Chadwick (1859) that we are interested in here is that prior to 1844, he
had
“... proposed, as an administrative principle, competition "for the field," that is to
say, that the whole field of service should be put up on behalf of the public for
competition, – on the only condition on which efficiency, as well as the utmost
cheapness, was practicable, namely, the possession, by one capital or by one
establishment, of the whole field, which could be most economically
administered, by one, with full securities towards the public for performance of
the requisite service during a given period. The principle was, upon due
consideration, extensively adopted and advocated by permanent public officers,
commissioners and interested public investigators foe the regulation of
enterprises in railways, then at their commencement; but the views chiefly
advocated by speculators and persons who profit by multiplied conflicts - who
gain whosoever else lose - were adopted by Parliament”
Chadwick (1859), pp. 385
This idea of "competition for the field" was called “contract management” by Chadwick (as
explained in Ekelund & Price (1979)) but it is analogous to the franchising of the modern
British railway system. Chadwick then provided empirical evidence on the problems with
British railways compared to those on the continent.
Firstly, on price he found that price discrimination was more marked in England as whilst 3
rd
class prices were roughly similar across Europe, 1
st and 2
nd class prices differed greatly in















st class 2.01 1.55 1.33 1.4 1.4
2
nd class 1.41 1.16 1.00 1.15 1.10
3
rd class 0.87 0.84 0.65 0.77 0.83
                                                          
9 This particular version of the bill failed to pass through the House of Commons. The act which was passed a
year later does have a clause for the doubling of the Burnley branch (which was subjected to the usual rigorous
safety inspections which it initially failed in June 1860 but passed in July) but not for a new station in Wigan as
work had already started on one.Draft as of 04/07/03 16
Secondly, on the fixed costs of building a railway price he found that these were much higher
in England which is partly explained by the anecdotal evidence of land prices being higher as















39275 25668 16391 14886 18465
In his 1865 address, Chadwick stated that
"I have seen no reason to alter the opinion .., that it was not necessary that what is
usually understood as the Government should undertake either the maintenance of
the old, or the construction of new works; that it might constitute a responsible
department to out them up for competition, to construct then, and form them on
conditions of direct public responsibility."
Chadwick (1865), pp.107
It is worth comparing that to this extract from a speech by Tom Winsor (Rail Regulator for
Great Britain) on 28
th January 2003
"By contrast, the SRA (Strategic Rail Authority) has a quite different and separate
jurisdiction. It awards, monitors and enforces passenger rail franchises. It
administers the system of grants for freight access, freight facilities and passenger
improvements. It makes loans and monitors and enforces the consumer protection
conditions of operating licences and exercises discretions under those licences.
And in all this, it devises strategies for using its powers so as to achieve its
statutory purposes. "
Winsor (2003), pp.13
Thus, the SRA constitutes a responsible department to put them up for competition (via the
passenger rail franchises), constructs new works (via grants and loans) and has direct public
responsibility (because it monitors and enforces the consumer protection conditions of
operating licences).
In his 1866 paper, Chadwick utilised the empirical analysis of his 1859 paper to argue the
case for nationalisation on the grounds that the railway system had major faults
“The chief defaults are first, those against unity of management for efficiency as
well as economy: - secondly, exactions on necessities, by means of monopolies,
instead of payments, merely for service, without profits; - thirdly – charges in
disregard of an economical principle of increasing ratios of consumption with
diminishing ratios of price by means of monopolies.”
Chadwick (1866), pp. 203
The criticisms of Chadwick were that:
1. On some main lines between cities, there was a duplication of capital which resulted from
the lack of unity (i.e. two lines competing for the same traffic - an example would be the
two routes from Birmingham to London)
2. There were scheduling problems for commuters which were the result of having to
change railway station to change from one train company to another.Draft as of 04/07/03 17
3. There were high search costs for commuters that resulted from their having to acquire the
timetables and fare schedules of several companies
10.
4. There were low levels of capacity utilisation which were the result of monopoly and the
application of price discrimination.
5. There was a lack of technological innovation which was caused by the existence of
monopoly.
These arguments can be briefly summarised as being that the railways were not productively
efficient (as prices did not fall as costs fell) and were extracting monopoly profit.
The History of Railway Regulation in Great Britain: The 1867 Royal Commission on
Railways
In 1865, Gladstone persuaded Lord Palmerston (the then Prime Minister) to establish a Royal
Commission to consider the possible nationalisation of the railways. Gladstone, who was now
Chancellor of the Exchequer, privately stated that he was in favour of the state buying up the
railways and leasing them for short periods of times under stringent conditions as
"they had too much influence, the present companies, they were becoming
powers in the state: and the waste of means by delay and diversion of traffic was
intolerable.
But if purchase by the State were impossible, or thought to be so, there would
remain various palliative measures. The control of parliament, or of the Board of
Trade, might be made far more stringent. The State could give in return:
1. Abolition of tax now levied on railways.
2. Indirect gain by abolishing other taxes on locomotion.
3. Saving of interest by taking over their debentures, the amount of which is
about £100,000,000"
Diary entry of Edward Henry
11 for 18
th March 1865,
quoting a conversation of 20
th February 1865 [Vincent
(1978)]
The Commission was led by Lord Devonshire and was intended merely to be a fact finding
body. As such it considered evidence from many parties on the various issues. For example,
returning to the issue of what was an acceptable definition of the toll proprietor charges that a
railway line owner could levy, the railways suggested that a clause of the form:
"It shall also be lawful for the company, acting as carriers, to make a reasonable
terminal for the accommodation afforded, and services rendered by them in
respect of any goods or minerals, other than the actual conveyance thereof along
the railway; provided always that such charge shall in no case exceed the rate of
2s. per ton for goods, and 9d. per ton for minerals at each terminal station of such
traffic …"
Royal Commission on Railways (1867), pp. 22.
                                                          
10 The timetabling issue was why Bradshaw's Railway Almanack was so popular. To quote from the instructions
of Sherlock Holmes to Watson in Doyle (1892)
"Just look up the trains in Bradshaw"
11 Edward Henry (the Right Honourable Lord Stanley MP, FRS) was to be a member of the Devonshire
Commission.Draft as of 04/07/03 18
should be inserted into all subsequent railway bills but the colliery owners strongly opposed
it. This was partly in response to an attempt of Thomas Gibson (the then President of Board
of Trade) to introduce a bill in 1865 authorising the setting of a reasonable fees for
"loading, covering and unloading of goods at any station on the railways, being a
terminal station in respect of such goods and for the delivery and collection and
other services incidental to the duty or business of a carrier"
Royal Commission on Railways (1867), pp. 22.
The Devonshire Commission was given anecdotal evidence of price discrimination being
practised in the operation of these toll proprietor charges but no hard evidence.
The Devonshire Commission took evidence from two figures we have already met - William
Galt and Edwin Chadwick.
Galt was the first of them to give evidence on Tuesday 7
th November 1865.
First, he was questioned about the profitability of railways in 1844 and responded that:
“At that time they were a very profitable investment; the principal railways were
paying 8 and 10 per cent. dividend”
Royal Commission on Railways (1867), pp. 311
Later, when asked if he thought it desirable that the fixed effect of a low tariff should be
ascertained, he responded
"I think so, for this very reason, that it appears that the very basis of legislation on
the subject is an accurate and clear knowledge of the effect a low tariff would
have on the increase of passengers. You know exactly, for instance, the cost of
transit, and you know precisely the fares that are paid in this country and abroad,
but unless you acquire a knowledge of the number of passengers that would come
under a low tariff; I think you are deficient in the very knowledge which is
absolutely necessary to enable you to legislate properly upon the subject. If it
should be the desire of the Commissioners to ascertain accurately the fiscal effect
of low fares, nothing could be more easy than to have the experiment tried on a
couple of lines, and if it were recommended to Government, and the Government
agreed in the view of the case, and recommended it to Parliament, in another
year, or two, at the time when you make your final Report you would be able,
definitely and distinctly, to say what was the effect of the low tariff, what increase
of passengers it produced, and so be able to legislate satisfactorily upon the
matter.”
Royal Commission on Railways (1867), pp. 313
This is an interesting response because Galt is quite clearly suggesting that an experiment
might be necessary to verify his results.
Galt quite clearly noted that there was collusion by the companies as demonstrated by this
exchange.
“Mr Roebuck: You consider that the companies have a monopoly; but does not
competition exist to a considerable extent between them? Here are
three railways, for example, between London and Liverpool; do
they not compete for traffic?Draft as of 04/07/03 19
Mr Galt: No, we cannot call it competition; they divide the monopoly, but
they do not compete. They agree as to the fares
12, and all charge
precisely the same, consequently there is still a monopoly.
Competition can only exist where there is such a number of
competitors in the market as to prevent combination. I cannot
assent to the proposition that merely because there are two or three
companies carrying passengers it is the less a monopoly, because
they agree upon certain terms.”
Royal Commission on Railways (1867), pp. 318
Galt noted that the 1844 Act was not capable of implementation:
“I think that it would not be practicable to carry out the Act of 1844. The Act
gives compulsory powers, but I do not think it possible to carry them into
execution; to deal with the four or five hundred millions of railway property upon
the compulsory principle is, I think, entirely out of the question.”
Royal Commission on Railways (1867), pp. 319
His own proposed scheme was essentially one of franchising.
“My idea is this, that all the railway property should be made the property of the
State, and that they should lease it out to companies. There are different ways of
managing it when the State has acquired it, but following this plan of leasing the
railways out to companies you make the terms first with reference to what the
public require. You say to the company, You must carry the public on such and
such terms; you must carry goods at such a rate, and you must carry parcels and
whatever may be necessary, at a fixed tariff, and then you would lease it out to
the company.”
Royal Commission on Railways (1867), pp. 319
It is worth noting that the shift in Galts expressed thinking that has occurred from 1843 (when
he believed in the state owning the railways and running them directly) to 1865 (when he still
believes in the state owning the railways but now believes that it should lease them out on a
franchise basis with price and quality controls).
Galt believed this would have other effects (such as on capacity utilisation as he believed that
trains were operating at less than 25% capacity)
“Mr Ayrton:  Your meaning is this, is it not, that it would be so, if their traffic
could be made three or four or so many times greater than it is at
present, without increasing their expenses?
Mr Galt: Yes, without increasing their expenses.”
Royal Commission on Railways (1867), pp. 320
Chadwick gave evidence on Thursday 10
th May 1866.
After an initial grilling by the Duke of Devonshire, Chadwick puts his cards on the table
about the utilitarian nature of his perspective in this exchange.
                                                          
12 A stable Railway Companies' Association, run through the Railway Clearing House, had emerged in 1861.Draft as of 04/07/03 20
“Mr Ayrton: Your view appears to be, that railways should not be constructed
for private profit by a company, but merely as a means of
communication from one part of the country to another?
Mr Chadwick: Yes, just as a highway is made. The main lines of communication
are the rightful service to the public, and free and safe
communication a duty of the State, and all the means to that end
ought to be maintained for the people. My idea is that branch
railways might be out on the same footing as turnpike road trusts,
out of the rates.”
Royal Commission on Railways (1867), pp. 840
Later on (in a remarkably monosyllabic exchange on his part), the idea of the state owning
the railways and leasing them out comes out in this discussion with Sir Rowland Hill
(inventor of the Penny Post).
“Sir R. Hill: If railways were made by the State, or by the owners of the land in
a particular district, you would recommend, as I understand you,
that they should be leased out to be worked?
Mr Chadwick: Yes.
Sir R. Hill: In drawing out a lease for that purpose I presume stipulations must
be made as to the maximum charge which the lessee would be
entitled to make?
Mr Chadwick: Certainly.
Sir R. Hill: Competition might be invited for the public from those leases, and
that competition might be made to depend upon the question as to
which of the several competitors would make the largest
reductions in the charges?
Mr Chadwick: Yes.”
Royal Commission on Railways (1867), pp. 841 - 842
Chadwick later emphasises the need, in his belief, for the expansion of the railways finances
at the local level.
“Earl Belmore: Am I to understand that you think it is advisable that branch
railways in this country should be made upon the same principle
that public roads are now made in Ireland, namely, out of the
public rates, and that after they are made that they should be
maintained out of the public rates?
Mr Chadwick: Certainly it is demonstrably the most correct course; correct in
economical and legislative principle that all charges on transit or
intercommunication of the nature of costs should be jealously
reduced; that all payments in the shape of profits beyond the bare
cost of proper service should for the future be rigidly excluded as
commercially wasteful and politically mischievous. The trunk
lines may be economically aided by subventions from the general
public or by the state - the branch lines by the local public. The
Irish Railway Commissioners, Captain Drummond, Sir John
Burgoyne, and their colleagues, proposed what is now regretted, as
the correct principle, which will be more regretted, as a return to
them is delayed, that the general railways should be so provide for,
the branch lines by advances secured on local or baronial rates, or
rates coincident with the immediate benefits."Draft as of 04/07/03 21
Royal Commission on Railways (1867), pp. 845
In an addenda to his verbal evidence, Chadwick made a lengthy written submission to the
Commission. I wish to draw attention to two paragraphs. In this paragraph, Chadwick seeks
to clearly distinguish his views from that of Galt.
"Agreeing with Mr. Galt on some main points, my own views of the principle
applicable to the question are distinct from his views, as also to the most eligible
method of carrying out the reform.  I attach more importance to the facilities for
future extension and completion of the capillaries of the system. … I wish
distinctly to be understood that I cannot agree with Mr Galt, that the existing
directories or any selection by them are the most eligible parties for the purpose."
Royal Commission on Railways (1867), pp. 855
In the second, he draws on another source we have already met to explain why the railways
are mismanaged.
"For what I have stated as to the commercial mismanagement of our railways I
have high commercial authority. The late Mr. James Morrison, who made
between three and four millions of money, will be acknowledged as the foremost
one. He explained to me the principles of his success, one of which was always to
consult the interests of the consumer. On asking him how it was that with such
apparently very simple principles he was so singular in their application or that he
had nor numerous successful competitors, he said that the fact was that with the
common commercial and trading minds it was rare to find any one who could act
constantly on principle."
Royal Commission on Railways (1867), pp. 855
In the end the evidence of Galt and Chadwick made little difference.
The final report of the Devonshire Commission in 1867 begun by detailing the success of the
existing regulatory system in terms of improving safety, establishing the operation of a
common gauge and enabling easy interconnection between routes. More importantly for
Gladstone and his ideal of the state buying up the railways, the Commission noted that the
nationalisation provisions of the 1844 act could not be put into place for a number of reasons.
Firstly, many parts of lines could not be bought because the building of them had been
authorised as part of legislation passed before 1844.
Secondly, railway accounts were incomplete and had been calculated on a variety of different
bases, despite the establishment of a requirement in the 1844 Act for them to be calculated on
a standard basis for the last three years of the 21 year probation period before nationalisation
could take place. Technically, the railway companies had broken the law here, but the
commission showed no enthusiasm for investigation save prosecution. As the accounts were
incomplete and had been calculated on a variety of different bases, it was impossible to
decide who has a rate of return greater than 10%
13.
                                                          
13 This should not have been a surprise. James Morrison had pointed out in 1846 that
"no precautions had been taken to settle the principle by which Parliament could obtain anything
like, an accurate knowledge of the net profits of railway companies"
An 1849 committee of the House of Lords had found that no set of railway accounts were comparable as current
and capital expenditures were often poorly distinguished and rail and non-rail business were not adequately
ring-fenced. A recommendation for separate accounts, a clear accounting convention and independent audits
was made but no proceeded upon (see Foster (1992) p. 32). This is an example of asymmetric information being
used to obscure what is happening - the railway companies are maintaining a set of accounts in an house styleDraft as of 04/07/03 22
Conclusion
The ideas of Gladstone on regulation had a carrot and stick approach. The stick element was
the administrative regulation of rail charges whilst the carrot was protection against the
competition of new lines. The ideas of Chadwick relied upon firms competing for a time-
limited monopoly.
Neither of these sets of ideas were effectively implemented in practice and thus the
discretionary era of railway regulation ended, primarily due to the strength of two factors; the
Victorian belief in the rights of private property and the opposition of the railway lobby. If
the 1844 Act had been passed twenty years earlier, before a mile of track had been laid, then
the regulation of Gladstone might have worked but by 1844 it was too late to have any real
effect given the strength of this belief in the sovereignty of private property.
A range of factors had to change for the railways to be less of an issue Firstly, the strength of
the belief in the rights of private property had to change and this did happen as the nineteenth
century wore on. Secondly, the power of the railway lobby in Parliament had to diminish and
this occurred as suffrage became more universal. Thirdly, the railway companies continued to
favour growth instead of profit maximisation with the returns on railway stock falling to 4%
by the time of the first world war.
For Gladstone, another chance at railway regulation occurred when he became prime
Minister but Ireland dominated his time.
Ultimately, it seems that the main lasting value of the debate surrounding the 1844 Act is as
an example of how ideas reoccur in economics.
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(which the 1849 committee noted were often audited by two shareholders) so comparison between companies is
virtually impossible.Draft as of 04/07/03 23
Bibliography
Averch, H. and Johnson, L.L. (1962), "Behavior of the firm under regulatory constraint".
American Economic Review, Vol. 52, pp, 1053 - 1069.
Chadwick, E. (1859), "Results of Different Principles of Legislation and Administration in
Europe; of Competition for the Field as compared with Competition within the Field,
of Service", Journal of the Statistical Society (usually called Journal of the Royal
Statistical Society), Vol. 22, pp. 381 - 420.
Chadwick, E. (1865), Address on Railway Reform, London : Longmans.
Chadwick, E. (1866), "On the Proposal that the railways should be purchased by the
Government", Journal of the Society of Arts, 9
th February 1866.
Checkland, S. G. (1971), The Gladstones: a family biography, 1764-1851, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Ekelund Jr., R. B. & Price, E. O. (1979), "Sir Edwin Chadwick on Competition and the
Social Control of Industry: Railroads", History of Political Economy, Vol. 11, pp. 213
- 239
Doyle, A. C. (1892), "The Adventure of the Copper Beeches", Strand Magazine, June 1892
[Reprinted in The Adventures of Sherlock Holmes]
Fetter, F. W. (1980), The Economist in Parliament: 1780 - 1868, Durham, NC, USA: Duke
University Press
Finer, S. E. (1952), The Life and Times of Sir Edwin Chadwick, London: Methuen
Foot, M. R. D. and Matthew, H. G. C. (Eds) (1974), The Gladstone Diaries Volume III: 1840
- 1847. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Foster, C. D. (1992), Privatization, Public Ownership and the Regulation of Natural
Monopoly, Oxford: Blackwell.
Gash, N. (1972), Sir Robert Peel: The life of Sir Robert Peel after 1830, London: Longman.
Hirst, F. W. (1931), Gladstone as Financier and Economist, London: Ernest Benn
Jenkins, R. (1995), Gladstone, London: Macmillan
McCulloch, J. R. (1843), The Principles of Political Economy, with a sketch of the rise and
progress of the science (3
rd edition), London: Longman, Brown, Green, and
Longmans.
McCulloch, J. R. (1848), A Treatise on the Succession to Property Vacant by Death:
Including Inquiries into the Influence of Primogeniture, Entails, Compulsory
Partition, Foundations, etc. Over the Public Interests, London: Longman, Brown,
Green, and Longmans.Draft as of 04/07/03 24
McCulloch, J. R. (1849), The Principles of Political Economy, with a sketch of the rise and
progress of the science (4
th edition), London: Longman, Brown, Green, and
Longmans.
Matthew, H. G. C. (Ed) (1978), The Gladstone Diaries Volume VI: 1861 - 1868. Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
Mill, J. S. (1870), Principles of Political Economy with some of their Applications to Social
Philosophy (7
th edition), London: Longmans
Morrison, J. (1848), Influence of English Railway Legislation on Trade and Industry,
London: Longmans
O'Brien, D. P. (1970), J. R. McCulloch: a study in classical economics, London: Allen &
Unwin
O'Brien, D. P. (1975), The Classical Economists, Oxford: Clarendon Press
Parris, H. (1965), Government and the Railways in Nineteenth-Century Britain, London:
Routledge & Kegan-Paul
Royal Commission on Railways (1867), Royal Commission on Railways Part I : Report from
the Commissioners of the Railways of Great Britain and Ireland with Minutes of
Evidence [reprinted as Irish University Press Facsimile Edition of British
Parliamentary Papers: Transport and Communications Volume 10 (1970), Shannon,
Ireland: Irish University Press]
Select Committee on Railways (1839), Second Report from the Select Committee on
Railways; together with the Minutes of Evidence, Appendix and Index [reprinted in
Irish University Press Facsimile Edition of British Parliamentary Papers: Transport
and Communications Volume 3 (1968), Shannon, Ireland: Irish University Press]
Select Committee on Railways (1844), Third Report from the Select Committee on Railways
[reprinted in Irish University Press Facsimile Edition of British Parliamentary
Papers: Transport and Communications Volume 6 (1970), Shannon, Ireland: Irish
University Press]
Smith, A. (1776), An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, London:
W. Strahan and T. Cadell.
Stephen, L. & Lee, S. (1963), Dictionary of National Biography - Dictionary of National
Biography from the Earliest Times to 1900, Oxford: Oxford University Press
Taylor, A. J. (1972), Laissez-faire and State Intervention in Nineteenth-century Britain,
London: Macmillan
Vincent, J. (Ed) (1978), Disraeli, Darby and the Conservative Party: Journals and Memoirs
of Edward Henry, Lord Stanley 1849 - 1869, Brighton: The Harvester Press.Draft as of 04/07/03 25
Winsor, T. (2003), "Licensing, access charging, path allocation and interfaces", Speech at
EuroRail 2003, 28
th January 2003 (available online at http://www.rail-
reg.gov.uk/filestore/speeches/eurorail28-1-03.pdf )Draft as of 04/07/03 26
Appendix A
Dramatis Personnae
(in alphabetical order by Surname)
Edwin Chadwick (1800 - 1890)
While studying in London to become a lawyer, Edwin Chadwick joined the Utilitarian
Society where he met Jeremy Bentham, James Mill and John Stuart Mill.  In 1832, Earl Grey
(then Prime Minister) initiated a Royal Commission of Enquiry on the Poor Laws to which
Chadwick was appointed as one of the assistant commissioners responsible for collecting
information. Chadwick emerged as one of the most important members of the investigation
and he was eventually responsible for writing nearly a third of the published report.
Chadwick officially retired in 1854 on a £1,000 a year pension but continued to campaign for
changes in the law including reform of sanitation, education and transportation.
More information on the life of Edwin Chadwick can be found in Finer (1952).
William Ewart Gladstone (1809 - 1898)
Gladstone entered Parliament in 1832. His first post in government were in the administration
of Sir Robert Peel were he first served as Vice-President of the Board of Trade from 1842-3
and then President from 1843 - 1845; it was this period where he became involved with
railway regulation. His resignation in 1845 over the increasing of the exchequer grant to
Maynooth led to a lengthy period outside of government. He returned to government as
Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1859 serving there until 1866 and developed a reputation as a
proponent of Free Trade and administrative reform. He became Prime Minister in 1868 and
continued in this post until his general election defeat in 1874 resigning the leadership of the
Liberal Party the following year. Gladstone returned to be Prime Minister again from 1880 -
1885, 1886 and 1892 -1894.
More information on the life of William Ewart Gladstone can be found in Jenkins (1995).
John Ramsay McCulloch (1789 - 1864)
John Ramsay McCulloch began his journalistic career as the editor of The Scotsman,
eventually moving on to the whiggish Edinburgh Review, where he served as economics
editor until the late 1830s. McCulloch used his position at the Review to popularise the
Classical theories and promote his favourite economic policies. McCulloch lectured on
political economy at University College London from 1828 to 1832 and was appointed
Comptroller of HM Stationary Office by Sir Robert Peel in 1838.
More information on the life of John Ramsay McCulloch can be found in O'Brien (1970).
James Morrison (1790 - 1857)
James Morrison entered into Business as a draper focusing on turnover to generate income -
his motto being 'small profits and quick returns'. He entered Parliament as a Liberal in 1830
for St. Ives, moving to Ipswich in 1831 which seat he kept until 1837 (with the aid of a
successful election petition in 1835). He re-entered Parliament in 1840 as a member for the
Inverness Burghs where he stayed until his retirement in 1847. He is of interest here for two
main reasons. Firstly, his speech of 17
th May 1836 where he urged that there should be a
periodic revision of the tolls and charges levied by railways and other public works.
Secondly, his successful attempt in March 1846 to obtain a Select Committee for the better
promoting and securing of the interests of the public in railway acts and the draft report this
committee produced which although not adopted at the time influenced much subsequent
legislation.
More information on the life of James Morrison can be found in Stephen & Lee (1963).Draft as of 04/07/03 27
Robert Peel (1788 - 1850)
Robert Peel became an MP in 1809 and became Home Secretary in 1822. Peel was Prime
Minister for a short time in 1834 to 1845 and again from 1841 to 1846. The second terms as
Prime Minister saw a range of economic reforms including the implementation of income tax
as a five-year temporary measure, a number of railway acts, a rationalisation and reduction or
abolition in duties on goods, the 1844 Bank Charter Act and the 1846 repeal of the Corn
Laws. It was this latter reform that was the main factor in the collapse of this second ministry
as his party split. Peel himself resigned and did not hold office again. He fell from his horse
on Constitution Hill on 29 June 1850 with the horse stumbling on top of him and Peel died
from his injuries on 2 July 1850.
More information on the life of Robert Peel can be found in Gash (1972).Draft as of 04/07/03 28
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